Post Typhoon Morakot Disaster Railway Reconstruction by Zhang, Shuang Gui & Su, Jie Ting
Kochi University of Technology Academic Resource Repository
?
Title Post Typhoon Morakot Disaster Railway Reconstruction
Author(s)Zhang, Shuang Gui, Su, Jie Ting
CitationSociety for Social Management Systems Internet Journal
Date of issue2012-05
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10173/1050
Rights
Text versionpublisher
?
?
Kochi, JAPAN
http://kutarr.lib.kochi-tech.ac.jp/dspace/
1 
Post Typhoon Morakot Disaster Railway Reconstruction  
 
Zhang Shuang Gui，Su Jie Ting 
Kaohsiung Engineering Section 
Taiwan Railway Administration 
 
Abstract  
Typhoon Morakot hit Southern Taiwan on Aug. 8, 2009 with ultra-heavy rainfall (1402mm). Due to 
high tide, the flow of Lin Bian River was unable to flow out into sea and the water flow crossed over the sea 
dike. The flood caused many breaks along dike north of Lin Bian River and the northern gate of Lin Bian 
River Railroad Bridge (3 meters at both left and right side) and 2 piers and 3 openings were blown off, plus 
120 meters of track base north of the bridge. The railway traffic was interrupted. 
 
The restoration work of the rail road was divided into 3 parts: 
1) Feeder Bus Service: TRA set up feeder bus stations at Fangliao Railway Station and Nanzhou Railway 
Station to transport passengers northern bound and south bound with fixed schedule every day. 
2) Restoration of Bridge Piers: This part include refilling of track base, restoration of piers, track work and 
electric works 
 Emergent survey on Aug. 9, 2009  
 Set up restoration budget and contracted out on Aug. 14, 2009 and commenced work on Aug. 15, 
2009 
 Working period was set of 150 calendar days (Phase 1 120 days, with Dec. 30, 2009 targeted to 
resume the traffic and 30 calendar days for demolishing the temporary bridge 
 Restoration of Piers NO. 10, 11 and 12 and refilling of 120 meters track base 
3) Stacking up of bridge piers: Following needs of the public and to boost the traffic safety, TRA 
commissioned CECI Engineering Consultants, Inc. Taiwan to stack up the existing bridge piers of Lin 
Bian River Bridge 2 meters during the outage period of the railroad.   
 On Sept. 3, 2009, CECI Engineering Consultants, Inc. Taiwan was commissioned to stack up 2 
meters the piers 
 The emergent stacking work budget was established and the job was contracted out on Sept. 14, 
2009 and the work commenced on Sept. 15, 2009. 
 Working period: 115 calendar days (Phase 1: 85 calendar days and Dec. 30, 2009 was targeted to 
resume the railway services and Phase 2: 30 days for demolishing temporary bridge 
 Added 2 meters high steel structure (total 21) on top of the piers and the RC pier was covered 
with steel clad and packed with concrete.   
 
This project was completed on Dec. 30, 2009 with the hardworking of engineers and workers and the 
full line traffic was resumed to connect with South Link Line.  
 
Keywords： Morakot、Lin-Bian River 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
TRA Linbian River Bridge is located at K54+790 of 
Pintung Line. The bridge is 413 m long and is 1 km 
away from the estuary . It is a non-electrified single 
line 60-year old steel bridge. Linbian River is a 
typical silt-depositing river. In this area, there are 
dense aquaculture farms and they need fresh water 
supply and the water is supplied by pumping 
underground water and it led to the subsidence of 
land. According to statistical data, the land surface 
has been sunk for 3.76 meters since 1971. (Fig. 1)  
 
The river is curvy and sand and silt brought by 
heavy rainfall in the past years deposited at the 
estuary and formed a delta. With the subsidence of 
land along the river banks, the land at estuary is 
apparently higher than the land adjacent to the bank, 
according to site survey and the river becomes a 
peculiar phenomenon of “Suspended River”. 
 
  Linbian River Steel Bridge was built on 1948. 
The upper structural beam is made of I-shape Upper 
Deck of 1.375 m deep and 19.7 m long. The lower 
structure is ∮4.00m 15 m deep casein foundation 
and the height of pier is 4.51 m high. The pier is 
made of concrete and is in the shape of semi-sphere 
in both sides facing the flow and back of the flow, 
and the perimeter is larger at the lower side and 
becomes slimmer progressively upward. 
Longitudinally the distance between supports is 0.75 
m and the distance between piers is 19.81 m and 
there are 20 piers in total (Fig. 2 & 3)           
 
(Fig. 2) Linbian River Bridge before Typhoon 
Morakot (1) 
 
(Fig. 3) Linbian River Bridge before Typhoon 
Morakot (2) 
 
Linbian River bed is deposited with sand and 
silt annually due to the change in environment and 
ecology and the dikes at south and north sides of the 
river have to be increased and they are already higher 
than the existing railway bridge. Taiwan Railway 
Administration (TRA) had been planning to rebuild 
the bridge and a joint survey was conducted in 
October 1995 and had requested twice for rebuilding 
in May 1999 and March 2000 (at estimated budget of 
NT$2 billion at that time).  
 
 
(Fig. 1) Accumulated subsistence of land in Pintung 
Area between 2001 and 2011. 
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However, due to short of fund, it was unable 
to rebuilt in time and the south and north dykes had 
to reserve gaps (1.2 m high and 6 m wide) for the 
rail traffic (Fig. 4). In order to prevent flooding 
through the gaps during high water level of tidal 
period or invasion of typhoon with heavy rainfall, 
TRA built water gates to both gaps in Aug. 1995 as 
an emergency measure, so that the traffic safety 
may be maintained. As to the reconstruction project, 
Railway Reconstruction Bureau has contracted the 
project to contractors in serial to build a new bridge 
at about 12 m downstream of the existing bridge for 
a dual track most update standard electrified railway. 
(Fig. 5) 
 
  
(Fig. 4) Old Water Gate of Linbian River Bridge 
Dyke Gap 
 
 
(Fig. 5) Bridge Pier of New Linbian River Bridge at 
the downstream side of old bridge.  
 
The extraordinary disaster in southern Taiwan 
brought by invasion of Typhoon Morakot, other than 
the causes (rising river bed and subsidence of land), 
was mainly due to excessive rainfall. According to 
the statistics of Central Weather Bureau, the 3 days 
(7th, 8th and 9th of August) the total precipitation hit 
historically high since measuring station was first set 
up in Taiwan and the accumulated rainfall in Chiayi, 
Tainan, Kaohsiung and Pintung was 2,500 mm and is 
almost equal to the accumulated average rainfall in 
one year in plain areas of Taiwan. In other words, in 
just 3 days, precipitation is equal to one full year. 
This is certainly in excess of the draining capacity of 
Linbian River. It was so heavy that there is not way 
for people to adjust to it and is the disaster Linbian 
Township had ever had. 
 
2. DAMAGES  
The heavy rainfall and huge flood brought by 
the Typhoon broke dikes of Linbian River and the 
town if literally submerged. The water level is as high 
as to the 2nd floor muddy water is flowing 
everywhere (Fig. 6) bodies of livestock and debris 
rushed along the streets. It was sad and amazing 
scene. The height of deposited soil in Linbian 
Railway Station was almost as high as the platform. 
(Fig. 7) 
 
 
(Fig. 6) The water level is as high as to the 2nd floor 
and muddy water is flowing everywhere. 
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(Fig. 7) The height of deposited soil in Linbian 
Railway Station was almost as high as the 
platform. 
 
Due to the changes in the environment and 
terrain, the distance between surface of water 
flowing area and the bottom of Linbian River 
Railway Bridge was only 2 meter. With the instant 
heavy water flow, the cross section that allows for 
water to travel became insufficient, added with 
volume drifting wood (Fig. 8), furniture, bamboo 
rafts blocked by steel beam of the bridge. Under the 
giant thrust, the bridge was unable to sustain and 2 
piers and 3 spans (P10, P11 & P12) were washed 
down (Fig. 9). 
 
The upstream dike of north abutment was 
smashed for 30 meters and road base was flown 
away for 120 meters. In south side, the road base 
was covered by mud for 50 meters and the railway 
traffic was interrupted (Fig. 10). 
 
 
(Fig. 8) Volume driftwood brought up from 
upstream 
 
(Fig. 9) Washed off 2 piers and 3 spans (P10/11/12) 
 
 
 
(Fig.10) Damages to north abutment 、Washed off 
Road Base. 
 
3. POST-DISASTER EMERGENCY REPAIR 
  After the damages caused to Linbian River 
Railway Bridge, TRA set up Emergency Response 
Team on Aug. 10 to conduct site survey and 
mobilized all the engineers to draw up budgets and 
drawing for emergency repair. The job was awarded 
on Aug. 14, 2009 for the repair. 
  Since the repair period was still in high water 
period (May to December) and is in typhoon active 
period of summer and autumn, and in order to avoid 
further disaster of possible invasion of typhoon, TRA 
took the following emergency measures: 
 
(1) Dismantle of Linbian River Railway Bridge 
Beams: After emergency joint survey of Aug. 
27, to avoid added damages of any further 
invasion of typhoon, TRA removed all 
remaining 19 sets of steel beam of the bridge on 
5 
Sept. 7 to give increase space for water flow. 
(Fig. 11) 
        
 
(Fig. 11) Bridge Steel Beams are totally lifted 
and moved away from site 
 
(2) Restoration of Piers: This part included 
repair of damaged piers, refill of washed off 
road base, track laying and related 
electricity supply, electrical equipment and 
signal equipment. These jobs were awarded 
on August 13, 2009 and commenced the 
site construction. (Emergency joint survey 
was conducted on Aug. 9, 2009. Emergency 
Repair budget was established and 
contracted out on Aug. 14, 2009 and 
commenced on Aug. 15 with working 
period of 150 calendar days). The first 
phase 120 calendar days, aimed at resuming 
traffic on Dec. 30, 2009, and 30 calendar 
days for removing construction temporary 
bridge, restoration of pier No. 10, 11 and 12 
and refilling of 120 meters road base (Fig. 
12) 
 
 
    (Fig. 12) Sketch of location of pier      
            restoration 
 
(3) Raising Pier Height: Since the Linbian River 
Railway Bridge is lower than the dikes and 
the New Linbian River Railway Bridge, 
which is under construction and is scheduled 
to open to traffic by Dec. 2011 and there are 
still 2 high water period, and in order to 
increase the traveling section and eliminate 
break, the bridge is planned to raise up for 2 
meters, after taking the slope restriction of 
railroad, the safety of pier structure and the 
traffic facilities of the surrounding area. The 
Project had price negotiation on Sept. 14, 
2009 and commenced site construction. [On 
Sept. 3, 2009, Ceci Engineering Consultant, 
Inc. Taiwan was commissioned to design the 
2-M pier height raising. The emergency 
raising budget was passed and job was 
contracted out on Sept. 14 with 
commencement on Sept. 15. The 
construction period was allowed for 115 
calendar days (Phase 1 is 85 calendar days, 
with Dec. 30, 2009 targeted for opening to 
traffic; Phase 2: 30 days for dismantle of 
construction temporary bridge). A 2-M high 
formed steel structure is added to the top of 
each pier (total 20 sets); each pier is clad 
with steel plate and restrained with concrete. 
(Fig. 13)  
 
 
(Fig. 13)  Adding 2 M high formed steel 
structure on top of pier and the RC 
piers are clad with steel plate and 
constrained with concrete. 
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4. REVIEW OF RECONSTRUCTION  
4.1 First Step 
On Sept. 17, 2009, a meeting for Discussion of 
Linbian Railway Station Service Resumption 
schedule, Reconstruction of Linbian River Steel 
Bridge and Construction Interface Issues was 
convened together with Water Resources 
Agency of MOEA, Pintung County Government, 
Railway Reconstruction Bureau and CECI 
Taiwan. Parties to the meeting agreed to the 
following:  
 
1) Height raising of Linbian River 
Railway Bridge is scheduled to 
complete by end of 2011; 
2) Damaged railway bridge is 
scheduled to reopen to service 
before Dec. 31, 2009  
3) The existing railway bridge shall be 
restored to 2-M higher as standard 
4) The competent agency of dredging 
and clearing of Linbian River is 
Pintung County Government; 
however, considering the high 
water period that follows, TRA 
agreed to coordinate related units in 
removing of deposited soil within 
the range of 500 M upstream and 
downstream of existing railway 
bridge and mid-point of Tai 17 
Highway bridge to the downstream 
500- meter of the railway bridge. 
5) The height-raising of current bridge, 
removal of deposited soil and the 
section for water flow under the 
bridge beam after the above shall 
satisfied the pass of expected 2011 
flood volume. 
 
4.2 Second Step 
On Sept. 22, 2009, TRA again invited Reconstruction 
Promotion Council, Ministry of Transportation and 
Communication, Water Resources Agency, the 7th 
River Management Office,  Pintung County 
Government, Railway Reconstruction Bureau, CECI 
Taiwan and Directorate General of Highway, plus 
Prof. Chao Wen-Chen of Department of Civil 
Engineering, Chiaotung University to further study 
the details that caused the flood, and parties to the 
meeting agreed to the following:  
 
1) The rainfall on the day Typhoon Morakot 
hit Taiwan was indeed excessive and 
was in excess of 200-year frequency 
precipitation.  
2) The S-curved flow of Linbian River 
offered different hitting angles and with 
the volume flood, along the river, from 
upstream to downstream, dikes were 
broken at many places. (Fig. 14)  
 
(Fig. 14) Linbian River hitting angles. 
 
3) The day was just the high water day that 
keeps the river water from draining out 
and forces the flood to pour on and over 
dikes. 
4) The cleaning of soil deposit, CECI Taiwan 
was asked to plan based on 100-year flood 
peak level and present to TRA with river 
management office for detail discussion. 
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5. STUDY OF POSSIBLE FACTOR OF THE  
DISASTER 
(1) Heavy transient rainfall: Up to at 
9:00 am, Aug. 8, 2009 (from Aug. 7, 
2009), the precipitation in Pintung 
area was already 2,000mm and the 
accumulated rainfall in the two days 
was almost the annual average 
rainfall of 2500mm. It would not be 
too exaggerating to say that the 
disaster would occur and would be 
in similar scale if the same rainfall 
dropped to any other place in 
Taiwan. 
(2) The high water time of Aug. 7 was 
21:00 pm which kept river water 
from draining into sea and the 
upstream was seen with several dike 
breaks.。 
(3) The low water time period on Aug. 8 
(03:00 – 05:00) was seen with the 
drag of low water washing the base 
of dike and vacated the content of 
dikes. This is proved by the time 
dike was found to have been 
smashed, 05:35 am. 
(4) The lower part of the river water is 
characterized with S-shape flow and 
the attacking angles are curved and 
water flow rushes to and from. This 
is why the dikes were broken in 
many places both upstream and 
downstream and the break was not 
limited to the railway bridge. (Fig. 
15) 
 
 
(Fig. 15) Broken dikes along the river found 
after the disaster. (3 at upstream) 
 
(5) Height of dikes at both ends of 
Railway Bridge: The dike at the north 
side of Linbian River is about 0.9 m 
higher than the south side. Based on 
the fact that no effluent found at south 
bank, there should not be any in north 
Bank .(Fig.16) 
 
 
(Fig. 16) South side gate was intact after the 
disaster due to deposit and stacking of 
drifting articles brought by the flood.  
 
(6) From the records of river bed prior to 
the typhoon, t he south side of the 
river had heavy deposit of soil and 
became dry land, and it obstruct water 
flow and when flood came, volume 
water was diverted to hit north side of 
the river bed and formed eddy current 
and washed off the foundation of dike. 
(7) Concluding from the above, the main 
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course of the disaster should be 
attributed to the heavy precipitation 
exceeding the 100-year precipitating 
frequency based in the designs of 
dikes and river and is exasperated by 
the factors of soil deposit on river 
bed and curvy channels unfavorable 
to the water draining. The later 
factors in turn resulted in insufficient 
accommodating capacity of river 
channel. Also the high water kept 
river water from draining to sea and 
the dragging force caused the 
washing and caving of foundation of 
dike are other causes. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
(1) Establish the concept of managing 
the bridge and river at the same time. 
River management agency and 
bridge management agency shall 
cooperate and coordinate with each 
other and shall set up a platform for 
communication, so that any issue 
can be dealt with jointly. 
(2) Timing and criteria for blocking 
bridge shall not be based on the 
height of water flow as the only 
basis. Velocity and washing 
conditions shall also be taken into 
consideration when making 
judgment. Bridge control agencies 
are recommended to take a deeper 
thought. 
(3) It is suggested that controlling 
agencies of bridges at the upstream 
and downstream shall have linked 
lateral reporting system to alert each 
other for avoiding occurrence of 
disaster. 
(4) Water resources Agency shall take 
initiative action, based on the bridge 
management system as reported by 
various units, to calculate the 
requirements of t he river under 
control of the agency and shall ask the 
related unit to improve with deadlines, 
and all these shall have been tracked 
and supervised, and shall also provide 
support when there is difficulty 
encountered. 
(5) River management agency shall 
initiatively provide the latest river 
management standard for the bridge 
control units to follow. 
(6) As engineers of a public sector, it is 
obliged to keep people from threats 
and damages of natural disaster, and 
when it is occurred, all units involved 
shall cooperate with each other, 
instead of impeding each other as the 
later would keep the repair at the first 
time impossible and the time of 
restoration would be delayed. 
(7) For the rivers found with issue, the 
resources controlling departments are 
recommended to provide resources to 
improve the situation to keep the 
people subject to the disaster away 
from the nightmare. This is 
particularly true in the era of global 
warming, climate change and frequent 
natural disaster, such as flood and 
earthquake, as they are unable to 
predict and an inch preparation is an 
inch protection. 
(8) This cost of the emergency repair is 
totaled at NT$147,324,605 
(Rebuilding of piers + bridge pier 
height increase = 62,086,612 + 
9 
85,237,993 = 147,324,605). 
Examined with the 2 high water 
period after resumption of traffic 
(2010 and 2011) the distance 
between bottom of the bridge and 
the surface of water flow of the river 
maintained at safety range and the 
expected effects are virtually 
achieved. 
(9) Rebuilding or reinforcing aged 
bridges shall be maintained and 
before the rebuilding is underway, an 
early warning system shall be 
established. 
(10) A life-cycle concept shall be 
introduced into design specification 
of bridge, in other words, the bridge 
shall be controlled in different 
manner in different stages of their 
life cycle, so that the bridges so built 
are operating under safety range and 
the public and user of the bridge may 
be warned and protected from the 
loss of life and property. 
(11) Government unit shall establish 
Bridge Management Measure for the 
managing agency to follow and to 
report for super vision and appraisal. 
 
7. AFTERWORD  
  The new Linbian River Bridge built by 
‘Railway Reconstruction Bureau was finally open 
to service on January 10, 2012 and the escalated 
railway of Linbian line is completed for service, the 
old Linbian River Railway Steel Bridge will be 
dismantled and it is scheduled to completed in April, 
2012, before the high water period of 2012. The 
interruption of railway service of Pintung Line and 
South Link Line due to closing of water gate during 
period of heavy rainfall will become history (Fig. 
17 & 18) 
 
(Fig. 17) New Elevated Platform of Linbian Railway      
Station. 
 
(Fig. 18) Train is switched to the elevated line.  
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